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This paper examines city formation in a country whose urban population is growing steadily over time,
with new cities required to accommodate this growth. In contrast to most of the literature there is immobility
of housing and urban infrastructure, and investment in these assets is taken on the basis of forward-looking
behavior. In the presence of these fixed assets cities form sequentially, without the population swings
in existing cities that arise in current models, but with swings in house rents. Equilibrium city size,
absent government, may be larger or smaller than is efficient, depending on how urban externalities
vary with population. Efficient formation of cities with internalization of externalities involves local
government intervention and borrowing to finance development. The paper explores the institutions


















Understanding city formation is critical to effective policy formulation in developing countries
that face rapid urbanization. While the enormous growth of urban populations in these countries is
well known, the rapid growth in the number of cities is not.  Between 1960 and 2000 the number
of metro areas over 100,000 in the developing world grew by 185%, i.e. almost tripled (Henderson
and Wang, 2007).  Moreover the UN’s projected two billion person increase in the world urban
population over the next 45 years ensures this growth in city numbers will continue.  How do we
start to think about why and how new cities are forming, what economic agents and institutions
play critical roles in the process, whether the proliferation of cities is following a reasonably
efficient growth path, and how policies may assist or constrain achievement of better outcomes?
We start with two fundamental premises which define the research agenda.  The first is
that city formation requires investment in non-malleable, immobile capital, in the form of public
infrastructure, housing, and business capital. Our focus is on housing capital where housing is
immobile and long lived, with a historical gross depreciation rate of about 1% a year and a net rate
after maintenance of almost zero. We will argue that the individual housing construction decisions
of competitive forward-looking builders play a key role in determining when cities start-up and
when they grow, an idea new to the literature. The second premise is that, in developing countries,
a key policy issue concerns how growing cities finance infrastructure investments and subsidize
the development of industrial parks so as to attract businesses (World Bank, 2000). We will show
that a city’s ability to borrow against future incomes (or receive revenue transfers from the center)
is required for an efficient growth path; yet such policies generate considerable controversy
(Greenstone and Moretti, 2004 and Glaeser, 2001) and we explore reasons for the controversy.
We consider a country where the urban population is growing steadily through ongoing
rural-urban migration and there are substantial sunk capital costs of housing and associated urban
infrastructure. Competitive housing builders within cities are forward-looking, anticipating
income streams that will be earned in new and in old cities and making individual investment
decisions driving the development of cities. In the resulting equilibrium, cities form and grow in
sequence. In the base case we have pure sequential growth, where first one city grows through2
rural-urban migration to its final stationary size, then a second city starts from zero population and
grows continuously to its stationary size, and then a third and so on.  Extending the base case to
include heterogeneity across cities, we show that, while cities still grow in sequence from scratch
to some level, they also experience later repeated episodes of further growth, in parallel with other
cities. Under particular circumstances they evolve with a size distribution consistent with Zipf’s
Law (Krugman 1996, Gabaix and Ioannides 2004). Once we allow for technological change and
adjustment costs in absorbing higher population inflows, cities may generally grow continuously.
However, the sequential pattern still holds in that new cities continue to form in sequence, with
much more rapid initial growth of a new city relative to older cities. 
The model highlights the role of housing builders, suggesting a new critical aspect of the
housing market and need for robust and transparent housing market institutions such as clear title
on land and housing and free entry into the building industry in efficient urban growth patterns.
We solve the model under two institutional regimes. One is a regime in which there are no ‘large
agents’: no public city governments nor private ones (large land developers). All individuals are
price-takers in all markets.  In this regime there are two fundamental insights of the paper.
First is that sunk capital investments act as a commitment device, which solves the
coordination failure problems that are endemic to the city formation literature.  In committing
investment, forward looking builders anticipate future city growth and rising productivity.  With
sunk capital investments,  equilibrium city sizes may be smaller or larger than socially optimal
depending, in an intuitive manner, on the way in which externalities vary with city size.
Equilibrium and optimal sizes may be quite “close”, which, as we note below, is in stark contrast
to the existing literature.
The second fundamental insight is that housing prices within cities vary over time, as
growth proceeds. When a new city forms,  the housing prices in old cities adjust in order to
maintain occupancy in both new and old cities. While rental prices are constant in growing cities,
realized incomes in those cities start low and grow as scale externalities become more fully
exploited. In existing stationary cities housing prices start high (inhibiting further in-migration)
when another new city first starts to grow, then they decline, and finally rise again towards the end
of the growth interval of the new city. Such a cycle is a testable hypothesis, where one can3
compare price paths in more stationary cities in developing countries with those in the current
fastest growing city. For the USA, Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) examine housing price
determinants in a fully urbanized country. They find positive local shocks are associated with
strong population growth of receiving cities, but have fairly modest effects on housing prices in
those cities. Cities that experience negative shocks have very sharp price declines but rather
modest or even zero population effects. The implication for urbanizing countries is similar: in the
face of growth of another city, stationary cities retain population through price changes, while
growing cities have stable prices.
The second regime we study is one in which large institutions play a role in city formation,
in particular private or public city governments which have powers of taxation and borrowing. City
governments borrow against future incomes in order to offer subsidies to attract new firms and
migrants, during the growth period in which urban scale economies are not fully developed. As
such, cities accumulate debt paid out of future tax revenues. The effect is dramatic: to smooth out
realized incomes, and as a result also smooth housing price cycles. The analysis suggests that the
ability of cities to subsidize entering firms relates not just to city sizes and the timing of city
formation (Rauch, 1993), but also to smoothing urban incomes over time. A potentially testable
implication is that countries where city governments have broad taxation and borrowing powers
have smoother housing price paths in older cities and smoother income paths in newer cities,
compared to countries where local governments are relatively inactive, with limited powers. 
These issues we have outlined are very different from the existing literature on urbanization
and city growth. The introduction of capital immobility in a dynamic context completely alters the
analysis of city formation and also yields a more “realistic” city formation path. We note three
problems with the current urban growth literature, which assumes perfect mobility of all resources
(e.g., see handbook reviews in Duranton and Puga, 2004 and Abdel-Rahman and Anas, 2004, as
well as Anas, 1992,  Black and Henderson, 1999 and Rossi-Hansberg and Wright, 2007). Since
there are no sunk capital costs in these models, in equilibrium there are large swings in city
populations. Urbanization proceeds by the first city growing until at some point a second city
forms, with the timing depending on the details of city institutions.  Regardless of those, when a
second city forms the first city loses half its population who migrate instantly to that second city. 4
Then the first city resumes growth and the second city grows in parallel until a third city forms, at
which point both existing cities lose 1/3 of their population who migrate to this new third city. And
so on. We don’t see such swings in city size in the data and our model has no such swings. The
second problem is related to the first. When new cities form in a perfect mobility context, they
jump instantly to some large size, rather than grow from scratch over time to a steady state size as
in the data.
 Third, in the traditional literature, without the intervention of city governments or “private
governments” (large scale land developers) who, through subsidies and zoning, co-ordinate en
masse movement of population from old cities into a new city, there is massive coordination
failure. New cities only form when existing cities become so enormously oversized that living
conditions deteriorate to the point where any individual would be better off defecting from existing
cities to form a “city” of size one. National urban population growth generates a dismal Malthusian
tendency towards enormously oversized cities. As noted above, in our model, the irreversible
investment decisions of competitive builders provide a commitment device to solve coordination
failure problems, so that equilibrium city sizes end up close to optimal ones. Since most
developing countries lack the local institutions required to generate co-ordination of en mass
movements of population, the possibility that decisions of competitive builders can solve the co-
ordination problem provides a helpful perspective. 
There are parts of the literature directly relevant to our central analysis. The effect of having
durable, immobile capital on single city growth has been tackled in Brueckner (2000).  However,
the only papers that examine new city formation as the population grows with durable capital are a
thesis chapter of Fujita published in 1978 and Cuberes (2004). Fujita examines planning, but not
market solutions. Cuberes in a paper written simultaneously and independently of ours has an
empirical focus, with a motivating model that has only two cities in total that ever form in the
economy. Cuberes doesn’t analyze the role of institutions in driving different types of equilibria, 
housing price cycles, and the general topics in this paper. This paper develops a model of city
formation under immobility of capital, building on Venables (2005) who illustrates that population
immobility will affect the city formation process.  There is a complementary paper on city
formation with durable capital by Helsley and Strange (1994) in which large private governments5
form cities simultaneously in a static context, using durable capital as a strategic commitment
device.  We have a dynamic context and for much of the paper there are no local governments; but
the Helsley and Strange paper introduces the idea that durable capital can function as a
commitment device to overcome coordination failure.
In the next two sections, the paper presents the model and derives the benchmark first best
planning solution. Section 4 analyses a market solution without local governments, developing the
key results in the paper concerning the role of builders and immobile capital. Section 5 compares
the equilibrium and the optimum; and introduces local governments than internalize externalities
and smooth income and price paths, highlighting the institutions required in this context and the
debt accumulation path of growing cities. Section 6 introduces heterogeneity; models Zipf’s Law;
shows how our basic growth results generalize to contexts with technological change and limited
rural-urban migration; and discusses how aspects of our theoretical results are consistent with
patterns in the data.
. 
2.  The model
In order to isolate the key elements in the urbanization process, we make four simplifying
assumptions.  First we assume a small open economy where agents can borrow and lend at a fixed
interest rate * in world capital markets.  We do not embed the process in a closed economy model
with capital accumulation and an endogenous interest rate. Second, we assume that the urban
sector grows in population by a constant amount, <, each instant, as if there were a steady stream of
population out of agriculture and into the urban sector.  Constancy of this rate is not critical to the
concepts developed in the paper.  For example, if the migration rate to cities responded to rural-
urban income differences, while that could affect city population growth rates, it would not affect
the process of how new cities form or the analysis of policies and institutions.  Third, in the base
case, we abstract from ongoing technological change which would tend to increase equilibrium and
efficient city sizes over time.  Finally to derive the key results, we assume that all cities form under
identical circumstances – technology, amenities, and industrial composition.  In Section 6, we
demonstrate the robustness of our key insights to the introduction of heterogeneity, technological6
(1)
change and a limited horizon for population growth. We start with a description of a city in the
economy, setting out both the urban agglomeration benefits and the urban diseconomies associated
with city population growth.  
Cities form on a “flat featureless plain” with an unexhausted supply of identical city sites,
and land is available for urban development at zero opportunity cost.  There are n(t) workers in a
particular city at date t and we define a worker’s real income, w(t), as 
As we will see, the first term is the worker’s output, the second is land rent plus commuting costs,
the third is housing rent and the final term is any subsidy (or, if negative, a tax) that the worker
receives. This real income expression contains all the components of earnings, subsidies, and
expenditures and define the amounts available to be spent on consumption of the numeraire good.
We discuss each of the components of (1) in turn.
Production:  Firms in a city produce a single homogenous good with internal to the firm constant
returns to scale, but subject to citywide scale externalities.  Given firm level constant returns, we 
assume that each worker is also a firm.  Under urban scale economies, workers benefit from
interaction with each other, with per worker output rising at a decreasing rate with city population.  
1
Formally, the city work force is n and per worker output is x(n), with x!(n) > 0, x"(n) < 0.  We also
assume that as n 6 0, x(n) $0, and x!(n) is bounded away from infinity. 
Commuting and land rent:  The second term on the right-hand side of equation (1) is land rent plus
commuting costs in a city of size n(t). All production in a city takes place in the city’s central
business district (CBD), to which all workers commute from residential lots of fixed size.  Free
mobility of workers requires all workers in the city to have the same disposable income after rent
and commuting costs are paid.  Thus, there is a land rent gradient such that, at all points within the
city, land rent plus commuting costs per person equal the commuting costs of the edge worker
whose rent is zero.  Edge commuting costs take the form   (the term in (1)) which is derived,7
along with expressions for rent and commuting costs, in Appendix 1.  The parameter c measures the
level of commuting costs and ( combines relevant information on the shape and commuting
technology of the city, in a modest generalization of the standard approach in the urban literature
(Duranton and Puga, 2004) to allow for different shape cities and for commuting costs which are an
iso-elastic function of distance. If commuting costs per unit distance are constant then, in a linear
city ( = 2, and in a circular or pie shaped city ( = 3/2.  Our basic restriction is that ( > 1, so average
commuting costs, as well as average land rent, rise with city population.  Integrating over the
commuting costs paid by people at each distance from the centre and over their rents gives the
functions TC(n) and TR(n) reported in Table 1. 
Housing:  A plot of city land can be occupied by a worker only after a fixed capital expenditure of
H has been incurred.  This represents the construction of a “house”, which could conceptually
include infrastructure such as roads, sewerage, water mains, and energy delivery. The housing
construction, sale, and rental markets are all assumed to be perfectly competitive, and the spot
market rent of a house at time t is denoted h(t), this paid in addition to the rent on land.  Throughout
the paper we assume that the two rent components are separable; housing rent, h(t), is paid
separately from land rent which is determined by the city land rent gradient. We also assume that
the two sources of income can be taxed separately. Under this separation, house builders may rent
land from land owners with an infinite lease and pay land rents according to the perfectly foreseen
city land rent gradient.  Alternatively builders could initially buy the land from the land owners,
capitalizing the land rents.  And a model with owner-occupancy where residents buy land and
housing would yield equivalent results.  Land owners are people outside the urban sector, although
the same results on city formation hold if they are nationwide Arrow-Debreu share holders in the
land of all cities.   While we assume housing does not depreciate, it is a minor adjustment to have
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depreciation which would be offset by maintenance as long as a lot is occupied. The critical
assumption is that some sufficiently large sunk investment has to be made for each urban worker.
Subsidies and taxes: The final term in equation (1) denotes a per worker subsidy at rate s(t) (tax if
negative) to workers in the city at date t.  Since workers are also firms, the subsidy could be viewed8
as going to firms, a common element of city finance. We  investigate use of subsidies in Section 5.
Table 1 summarizes key relationships in a city with population n.  The left-hand block of the
table reports the basic relationships between commuting costs and land rent, derived in Appendix 1. 
The right-hand block defines relationships which we will use repeatedly through the paper and
which, for convenience, combine the technologies of production, commuting, and urban land rent.
Total surplus, TS(n), is the output minus commuting costs of a city of size n; notice that this is
defined excluding housing costs.  Average surplus AS(n) and marginal surplus MS(n) follow in the
usual way.  LS(n) is the surplus per worker after subtracting average land rent paid to landowners,
LS(n) / AS(n) - AR(n); or it is wage income net of land rent and commuting costs for any worker
before subsidies, to be spent on housing and all other goods. It follows from equation (1) that
.  Finally, EX(n) = MS(n) - LS(n) is the production externality
associated with adding a worker-firm to the city: it is the increase in output of all other workers in
the city when a further worker is employed.
 
Table 1: Commuting costs, land rents, and surplus.
edge commuting cost =
land rent+commuting cost
Total surplus:        TS(n)
Total commuting costs:
     TC(n)
Average surplus:  AS(n)
Total land rent: 
     TR(n)
Marginal surplus: MS(n)
Average land rent: 
     AR(n)
Labour surplus:   LS(n) /   
 AS(n) - AR(n)
Externality:       EX(n) =     
MS(n) - LS(n)
The shapes of these functions are critical, and we state assumptions that are sufficient for the
propositions that follow.  
L A1: LS(n) is strictly concave in n with unique interior maximum at n  ,  , and9
such that as  n ÷ 4, LS(n) < LS(0). 
Notice that if   < 2 then this assumption is stronger than concavity of x(n). From A1, it follows that
AS(n) is strictly concave (since ( > 1), but we also assume:
A A2: AS(n) has interior maximum at n , .
AL A1 and A2, together with ( > 1 and our assumptions on x(n) imply that:  (i)  n  > n .  (ii)  MS(0) =
A AS(0).  (iii) MS(n) intersects AS(n) from above at n  .  MS(n) is initially increasing and is decreasing
AA for all n > n , since after n  , MS!(n) = 2AS!(n) + nAS"(n) < 0. However, in characterizing the
planning solution to ensure pure sequential growth, as in  Fujita (1978), we assume explicitly that
the total surplus curve, TS(n), has the textbook S-shape, or that: 
A3: Starting from n = 0, MS(n) is strictly increasing in n until it peaks, after which it is strictly
decreasing.
A Figure 1 illustrates these relationships. The average surplus curve has a maximum at point n . 
Marginal surplus and average surplus start at the same point, then marginal lies above average until
AL A   they intersect at n .  Surplus net of land rents, LS(n), lies below AS(n), with a maximum at n  < n .  
Our analysis also requires an assumption that the magnitude of housing construction costs,
H, be large enough to ensure that housing is never left empty; this prevents jumps in city size.  The
issue arises in different contexts and here we state a condition sufficient to apply in all cases: 
A4:  .
The first part of A4 states that the interest charge on housing per worker is at least as large as the
difference between the maximum level of surplus per worker and its level in a new city with zero
initial population. This implies that housing costs are high relative to net agglomeration benefits of
cities, and the aptness of the assumption could be debated empirically.  However we note that
assumption A4 is an all-purpose sufficient condition; in each of the situations we examine only
lower relative magnitudes of housing costs are necessary. The second part of A4 ensures that
urbanization will occur because migrants will be willing to pay rents to be in cities.
We now turn to the social welfare maximum to establish a benchmark and basic concepts. 10
(2)
(3)
3. Socially optimal city formation
Population, arriving at < per unit time, flows into one or more new cities.  How should this
population be allocated across cities over time? Fujita (1978) wrote a book solving this problem in
different and often more complex contexts, albeit without the market and institutional analyses
which is the subject of this paper. Given Fujita’s detailed solution, we focus on providing intuition
and a summary proposition.
The objective is the present value of the total surplus, net of housing costs, of the entire city
i system.  Distinguishing individual cities by subscripts, the population of city i at date t is n(t) and
the optimisation problem is to choose flows into each city,  , to maximise:
The first  term in the objective is the present value of the surplus generated by all cities that ever
form, and the second term subtracts from this the cost of housing.  The first constraint with
mutiplier   has total population changes across all cities sum to the national flow, <.  The
remaining constraints with multipliers   restrict each city to never contract. As a consequence
(since there is continuous population inflow) there are no upwards jump in the population of any
city. We impose this as a constraint here, and show in appendix 2C that condition A4 is sufficient
for it to be satisfied. Notice that with this constraint there are never unoccupied houses in the urban
system so the total cost of housing, the final term in the objective, is the same regardless of the city
structure. 





If city i is growing at date t, then  , so  .  Thus, if a pair of cities i, j are growing
simultaneously they must have   and hence be identical with  .  This
condition rules out many possibilities; for example, it cannot be optimal to start a new city during a
period when an existing city is continuing to grow.  Optimality requires either a single city growing
at any one time, or multiple identical cities growing in parallel.  Integrating the Euler equation
forwards from date z gives condition 
 has natural interpretation as the shadow value of an additional worker entering city i at date z,
equal to the present value of the marginal surplus created by the worker. At any date z when there
are existing cities which are not currently growing, for optimality these stationary cities must have a
common shadow value, which we denote  .  If these cities remain stationary at all future dates,
then they must have a common size, given
where T is the length of time each of these cities has grown in the past and <T is their stationary
population.  Consider a new city i, which starts growing at date J and grows at rate < until date J + T
when it stops.  We can check the optimality of this by looking at   for dates  .
This is, 
The first two terms on the right hand side split the shadow value of city i into the part when it is
growing, so has population <(t - J)  and when it is stationary.  Combining the last two terms 12
(7)
From this expression, we can see that it is optimal to grow city i during interval z , [J, J + T ] if;  
(i) At start date J,  . Optimality over the growth period of the city, requires
(ii) At stopping date J + T,    . This follows from (7); the integral is zero
because city i becomes identical to existing cities.
(iii) At dates  ,    .  This holds because the function MS(<t) is single
peaked (Appendix 2A) and says that the shadow value of adding a resident to the current growing
city is greater than that of adding a resident to a stationary city.  It implies that in the interval z , (J,
J + T ), it is better to continue expanding the current growing city than to start a new city.   Single
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opt peakedness also implies that there is a unique value of T = T  solving equation (7), as shown in
appendix 2A. This analysis implies that the shadow value of adding a worker to the current growing
city exceeds the shadow value of using that worker to start a new city, as long as   (for any
growth path a new city might follow). It is inefficient to halt growth of a new city until  . 
opt This establishes that sequential growth by single cities each growing for T  satisfies the first
order conditions.  Parallel growth by some number of cities k > 1 also satisfies the first order
conditions, by the same analysis but with < replaced by </k, and T adjusting accordingly.  However,
this yields a lower value of the objective, as gains from increasing returns are postponed (appendix
2B).  Finally, we imposed that  , ruling out the possibility that population goes temporarily
into existing cities and then moves out, allowing a new city to jump discontinuously to some
discrete size.  A jump has the advantage of delivering returns to scale instantaneously, but the cost of
jumps is that housing is left empty in old cities.  This cost depends on the magnitude of the sunk
housing costs, H, and in appendix 2C we show that assumption A4 is sufficient to rule out such
jumps.
This analysis yields the following proposition.
Proposition 1.  
(I)  In an efficient city system cities form and grow strictly in sequence, each growing without13
opt interruption to their final size.  The period of growth is the value T = T  solving
 , (7') 
opt opt and the associated population is n  = <T . 
opt A (II) Given * > 0, city size is larger than that which maximizes surplus per worker, n  > n .
opt  Equation (7') is (7) with time set so that J = 0.  Uniqueness of T  and part (II) are proved in
appendix 2A.   
The intuition behind condition (7') is that city size is chosen so that the present value of the marginal
surplus from adding a worker to a new city, MS(<t), equals the present value over the same time
frame of the marginal surplus from adding the worker to an existing city, MS(<T).  Light can be shed
on part II by observing that (7') can be integrated by parts to give
 (8)
opt opt opt If  * = 0 this reduces to TS(<T )/<T  = MS(<T ), i.e. the equality of average and marginal surplus. 
opt A In the absence of discounting, the optimal city size is therefore at the maximum of AS with n  = n . 
opt opt A,  A positive discount rate increases T , giving n  > n because  discounting makes it more costly to
bring forward the low values of average surplus associated with early years of a new city.  This can
be established by differentiating (8) to show that dT/d* > 0. The result is intuitive. A higher discount
rate puts more weight on the low surpluses that are initially earned in a new city, discouraging city
formation.   
4. Competitive equilibrium without city governments
Given this benchmark, we now turn to equilibria under different institutional settings, starting with
the situation in which there are neither public governments nor private ones in the form of large14
(10)
property developers who might internalize externalities. We continue to assume that all potential
cities have identical technologies, and establish that there is an equilibrium in which cities grow
eq strictly in sequence; there is a length of time T  for which a new city grows before it becomes
stationary and growth commences in the next new city. We then argue that an equilibrium with
i sequential city growth is the only “stable” equilibrium.  In this section there is no government so s(t)
= 0, but we carry subsidy terms through initial equations for reference in Section 5.  Assumptions on
technology are relaxed in section 6.
There are three types of economic agents, all price takers operating in competitive markets.  
(i) Landowners, who are completely passive and simply receive rent according to the city land rent
gradient, as discussed in Section 2.  
(ii) Workers, who are perfectly mobile between cities and occupy one house in the city in which they
work. This mobility implies that equilibrium real income w(t) must be the same in all cities.  From
equation (1) and the definition of LS  (Table 1), mobility implies that at any date, t, and in any city, i,
given the common w(t), house rents satisfy 
ii i h ( t )  = LS(n(t)) + s(t) - w(t). (9)
(iii) Builders, who construct and supply housing.  Housing is available on a spot rental market, and
house construction requires sunk cost H.  Builders have perfect foresight and maximise the present
value of profits earned on construction of a house. They take as given the equilibrium w(t) path and
i the consequent h(t) paths from equation (9). We denote the present value of profits for a builder in
i city i with construction date z, by A (z),
Since houses are always occupied (a consequence, as we shall see, of assumption A4), housing
construction is going on in city i if and only if the city is growing.  Competition amongst builders




An implication of (11) is what we call the ‘no-switch condition’. In equilibrium, if at some date z city
i is growing and city j is stationary, then 
where ^ denotes an existing stationary city and the second equation uses (9). Equation (12) states that
builders will not deviate to switch from building in city i to city j, because the present value of rents in
i is at least as large as that in j. 
Given these conditions, we characterise the equilibrium with the following proposition. In this
i situation since subsidies are zero, the proposition is stated and proved for s(t) = 0.
Proposition 2:  
There is a perfect foresight competitive equilibrium (without city government and in which cities
have identical technologies) in which cities grow strictly in sequence and:
eq (I) Each new city grows uninterrupted for a length of time T  = T where T solves 
 , (13)
eq eq eq L  L and the associated final population of each city is n  = <T . <T > n , where n  is the size which
maximises labour surplus. 
(II) Workers’ real incomes, w(t), first increase and then decrease during the growth of each new city,
and this is transmitted to existing cities via variation in house rents in those cities.
Proof:  Mobility of labour between cities implies that real incomes are equalised across cities at any





Let city i be a new city which starts growing at time J and absorbs all migrants.  While the city is
i growing,  , builders earn zero profits,  A(z) = 0; differentiating (10), this implies
This says that rents in a growing city equal the interest charge on new housing, *H.  In existing cities,
population is  , so using (15) in (14), housing rents in existing cities are
Strictly sequential growth can only be an equilibrium if it is not more profitable to build in existing
cities, compared to the current growing city.  This is the no-switch condition, and using (15) and (16)
in (12),
The difference in the present value of profits is broken into two parts: the integrals up to date  ,
the date when city i stops growing, and integrals for terms beyond  .  For an equilibrium we
require three things:
(i) At starting date, z = J,   .  At  the instant of construction switching to city i from
the previous growing city, j, profits in both cities are zero. 
(ii)   so that at the stopping date, z = J + T ,   .   
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Conditions (i) and (ii)  give equation (13) of the proposition (with time set such that J = 0). As in the
proof of proposition 1, single peakedness to the function LS(<t) implies that there is a unique value of 17
 satisfying (13).  These conditions also imply that    and . See appendix 3.
(iii) For  , (17) is satisfied with inequality, which is the no-switch condition in (12) in this
situation. It follows because LS(<t) is single peaked as shown in appendix 3..  
Part (II) of the proposition follows similarly from the fact that   first rises and
then declines for  .  From equation (16), rents in existing cities start high, decline and then
rise again towards the end of the growth interval. From appendix 3,  , ensuring houses are
always occupied in existing cities.
The time paths of income and rent are illustrated in Figure 2.  The top line gives the output
minus land rent and commuting costs of a worker in a city founded at date 0, LS(<t).  During the life
Le q of the city this rises to a peak at T , and then starts to decline until date T  is reached, after which it is
stationary.  The worker also pays housing rent which, during the growth of the city is simply *H.  The
worker’s real income net of housing costs is the difference between these, given by the middle line
LS(<t) - *H, which varies over the life of the city.  
eq eq In the time interval [T , 2T ] another city is growing and offering its inhabitants the income
schedule LS(<t) - *H.  Workers are mobile, and remain in the first city only if rents follow the path
 (equation 16).  Thus, there are housing rent cycles in old cities as the housing market adjusts to
conditions in the current growing city.  As illustrated in Figure 2 house rents in old cities jump up
when a new city is born as this city is initially unattractive; they are then U-shaped, reaching *H at the
point where the new city is the same size as old ones.  The process repeats indefinitely with
eq periodicity T , so stationary cities have a rent cycle in response to the possibility of migration to the
growing city.  
Viewing Figure 2, one might ask why, once a new city starts, builders do not continue to build
eq eq in old cities in which rents are higher. Once building starts in a new city (at dates T , 2T , etc) initial
builders in the new city know that they will be followed by further builders in that city. The key is that
housing investment is irreversible; any further housing built in old cities cannot be moved to a new
city when rents in old cities start to fall. One can also use Figure 2 to gain further insight into the
eq equilibrium by considering alternative T to T  as candidate equilibrium values.
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4.2 Uniqueness and stability of Equilibrium
Proposition 2 characterizes an equilibrium in which cities form in sequence and each grow to the
same size. However the equilibrium we describe is not unique.  There are also equilibria with
sequential growth, but with multiple cities growing in parallel during each sequence.  Such cities have
i to be identical; LS(n(t)) must have the same value for equation (14) to hold with rents  .  Thus, if
there were k growing cities the population of each city t periods into its growth would be <t/k and the
proof of proposition 2 goes through as above, but with < replaced by </k.  However, we think it
reasonable to concentrate on the equilibrium with a single city growing at each date, k = 1, by a
stability argument.  If, at any date close to the start of the cities’ growth, a slightly higher share of
i migrants goes to one city relative to the other growing cities then, since LS(n(t)) is an increasing
function, the return to workers in this city will rise relative to the others. From equation (9), rents that
can be charged in the other growing new cities would fall below  , so that building would cease in
these other cities. 
An alternative approach to the problem would be to structure a game where it is sequentially
eq rational only for builders and migrants all to enter the same growing city until it reaches size <T  ,
before then switching to a new city. In a potential equilibrium where they split across multiple cities,
it pays any builder and migrant to deviate to move to another growing city since that would raise
income, LS, and chargeable rent, following the same logic as the stability argument. We footnote the
outline of a three stage game played at each instant starting from time zero when cities first start to
form, where the equilibrium is unique in both prices and development paths.  
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4.3 Other Aspects of the Equilibrium.
In the next section we turn to comparing the equilibrium with the social optimum, but now make a
few further remarks about the equilibrium.  First, city size is greater the larger is the discount rate.
This property is the same as for the optimum, and the proof follows from replacing the function MS
by the function LS.  
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Second, equation (13) can be rearranged to read  
(13')19
The left-hand side is the present value of income for the first person in a new city; and the right-hand
side is the present value of the alternative, entering an old city.  These are equalized at the switch
point of migration into a new city, where migrants are indifferent between migrating permanently to a
new versus an old city.  This equation arises in Venables (2005) where, once migrants have chosen a
city, they are assumed to be perfectly immobile thereafter.  Here this equation is satisfied not because
of an assumption of immobility, but because of sunk housing costs.  Builders choosing to build in the
city with the highest present value of rents yields the same outcome as workers choosing to live in the
city that yields the highest present value of incomes.
A further property of the equilibrium is that workers who happen to enter the urban system in
the middle of a city’s growth period receive a higher present value of income than those who enter at
the beginning or end.  This follows because, as we showed in the proof of Proposition 2,
,  with strict inequality between endpoints. 
Entrants at these intermediate dates get a “surplus”, by avoiding the low incomes of a start-up city.  
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This surplus plays a key role in the analysis of city government behavior later, where surpluses are, in
essence, taxed away.
5.  Equilibrium versus Optimum
In this section we discuss the efficiency of equilibrium.  Are equilibrium city sizes too large or too
small?  Then we ask what national government policies or national market institutions would generate
optimality.  
Proposition 3: The competitive equilibrium without city government gives larger cities than
eq opt optimum, T  > T , if 
 , (18)
and conversely.
Proof: From table 1, EX(n) = MS(n) - LS(n).  Using equations (7') and (13),20
eq opt eq opt From Proposition 2, the integral terms on the right-hand side are positive iff T  > T .  Thus T  > T
iff the term on the left-hand side is positive. 
The interpretation of proposition 3 is direct.  Cities are too large [small] if the present value of
externalities created by a marginal migrant in a new city is greater [less] than the present value of
externalities created by that migrant in a stationary city, over the new city’s growth interval.  The
condition depends on how externalities vary with city size. For example, if the externality is
increasing in city size, as with the commonly used case in which x(n) is isoelastic, the present value of
externalities in an old city is greater than in new city.  New cities start up too soon and stationary sizes
are too small, because the ignored benefits of diverting migrants to a new city are less than the
ignored benefits of adding people to an old city.  However, the effect can go the other way, as would
be the case if the positive externality declined with city size (for example, due to congestion
externalities).
The fact that this equilibrium without city governments can result in smaller city sizes than the
social optimum contrasts with traditional perfect mobility analyses where a new city only forms when
the real income of a worker in a growing city falls to the level of LS(0) (i.e. LS(0) = LS(<T)), where it
pays people to leave the city, regardless of whether others follow.  The co-ordination failure problem
of static models is solved here because builders commit to new city development through initial fixed
H investments and have perfect foresight.  Now the comparison of equilibrium with optimum size just
turns on the present value of marginal externalities in new versus old cities, as one would expect from
applied welfare economics in a dynamic context.
5.1 Implementing an Optimal Solution: Pigouvian Taxation
Implementation of the optimum is, in principle, straightforward.  A national government announces a
subsidy schedule in which subsidies are a function of city size.  Builders thinking of starting
construction in a new city know that migrants to the city are guaranteed this schedule as the city
grows, and then when it is stationary.  The subsidies are financed out of lump sum national taxes21
which could be on the entire population, on all urban residents, or on land rents.  
Proposition 4.  If the national government enacts a Pigouvian subsidy schedule for residents of all
cities, s(t) = EX(<t), then the competitive equilibrium without city governments will be socially
optimal.
Proof: In equation (12), replacing  LS(<t) +  s(t) by LS(<t) + EX(<t) = MS(<t), the new version of (13)
is condition (7'). 
The proposition is intuitive, since the only distortion present in the competitive equilibrium is
workers’ failure to internalize the externalities they create for other workers.   This solution, like the
9
competitive one without city governments, has fluctuating housing rents according to equation (16).   
10
Note that, in the solution, there is an issue of whether national governments can credibly commit to
long term national subsidy schedules.
5.2  Competitive equilibrium with private local governments
We turn now to a regime in which there are large private agents or property developers.  A well
known result from the  literature on urban systems with perfectly mobile resources is that the presence
of such large agents can secure an efficient city size (Henderson 1974, Rossi-Hansberg and Wright,
2007).  We formulate the problem here for the case of private local governments determining optimal
subsidy paths; in Henderson and Venables (2005) we show the solution extends to public
governments, where voters at each instant determine subsidies. Since the analysis confirms the usual
result that local governments can internalize externalities and implement efficient solutions, our
presentation is brief and focuses on the important, distinctive features that arise in a dynamic context
with sequential city formation, compared to the usual analysis. Here, local governance affects the
income distribution between early and later entrants to a city, dramatically changes housing market
outcomes, involves debt accumulation by local governments, and requires institutions that support
such financing.
Following Henderson (1974) we assume that, at any instant, there is an unexhausted supply of22
(19)
potential large developers who each own all the land that will ultimately be used in their individual
city and who collect all land rents in their city.  They can borrow in capital markets and can subsidize
worker-firms.  However, they face competition from existing and other potential new cities and are
induced to offer migrants subsidies to enter their city.  These subsidies are guaranteed for all time. An
example for the USA are contracts offered to new firms in a city that give tax breaks or offer wage
subsidies over sustained periods of time. We continue to assume that housing is constructed by
perfectly competitive builders and rented on a spot rental market, but we also look at the case where
the land developer, or private government owns all housing. Housing rents remain distinct from land
rents: land rents paid to the developer at each instant equal the rent from the urban land rent gradient.
To find the equilibrium we proceed as follows.  Price-taking builders, mobile workers,
competitive determination of land rent gradients within each city, and imposition of a stationary
equliibrium are as before. As cities form sequentially, the developer of each new city chooses a
i subsidy schedule, s(t), to maximize profits, subject to the constraints of free mobility of workers and
construction decisions of builders. Developer profits are the land rents earned in her city net of
subsidy payments,
and free entry of developers means that equilibrium profits will be zero. Free mobility requires that
the per worker subsidy in any city at any instant is consistent with workers earning the current real
income, w(t), in the national labor market. Construction decisions require that builders in the current
growing city would prefer to build in the growing city as opposed to any stationary city, the no-switch
condition in (12).
Proposition 5.  Equilibrium with competitive private city governments supports the social optimum. 
Workers’ real income is constant through time in all cities at level  .  Rents are
constant through time in all cities at a level  . Subsidy payments s(t) vary across the life of the city,
satisfying  LS(<t) + s(t) - *H. 23
(20')
(20)
Proof:   The objective of the developer of city i is to maximize the present value of rents net of
subsidy payments, subject to the no-switch condition as in (12), which already incorporates the
behaviour of mobile workers and far-sighted competitive builders.  The instruments are the subsidy 
schedule   together with terminal date   at which the city stops growing, after which the subsidy
 is constant.  Thus, we solve the program 
where LS(<T) and s(T) are respectively the earnings of workers in a stationary city and the equilibrium
subsidy in stationary cities. In Appendix 4, we prove that the constraint holds with equality for all J 0
i [0, T], so  , which says simply that the subsidy is set at the lowest rate
that attracts builders and workers (satisfying the no-switch condition) given existing cities are offering
.  This enables us to substitute the constraint directly into the objective and,
noting that TS(<t) = TR(<T) - <tLS(<t) (Table 1) the optimisation programme can be written as
i Optimal choice of T gives first order condition
   
 (21)
i With free entry of developers, in equilibrium their profits, R, must be zero. Using (21) in (20') and24
(22)
integrating by parts (applying (A4) and then (A5))  and setting profits equal to 0, we get 
The value of T solving equation (22) characterizes city size in the large developer case and, from
opt equation (7') of proposition 1, its value is T .  There remain two issues.  First, the optimization
problem has workers flowing smoothly into a new city at rate <, giving population <t.  Appendix 4
shows that a developer could not profitably induce a jump in population to some discrete initial size.
opt Second there is the issue of why the subsidy path needs to be guaranteed.  Consider dates t > T .  At
such dates all housing construction in the city is sunk, so any reduction in s(t) would be exactly
matched by a reduction in house rents.  The developer can therefore expropriate whoever owns the
housing stock.  In order for housing construction to take place, the developer has to commit to not do
this, so the full time path of subsidy payments to workers must be guaranteed. 
In the developer equilibrium, residents have a flat real income schedule inclusive of subsidies
over all time, in contrast to Section 4.  This has two further implications.  First, there are no rent
cyles, of the type illustrated in figure 2.  As income streams are flattened, so are rents.  Second, in
Section 4, workers who enter the city system during a city’s growth period have higher present values
of incomes than those who enter at the very beginning/end of the period. In the present case,
optimization by the developer extracts this surplus, so that incomes of all entrants are the same
regardless of date of entry.
In Henderson and Venables (2005) we prove a related corollary that provides another
perspective on the results. Competition induces the developer to pay the highest constant income
possible, given zero profits.  That is, competition to form the current new city requires the developer
to pay the highest income possible to the initial residents (so they do not go to other potential new
cities), subject to the no-switch constraint that building does not later resume in old cities.  That
constraint requires that later residents are paid no less than initial ones; i.e. everyone is paid a constant
income.  If later residents were paid less, then rents would rise in old cities and induce builders to
construct houses there because the no switch condition is violated.25
(23)
(23')
5.3. Financing city development
Critical to being able to offer the constant real income   at each instant is the
ability of the developer to borrow and accumulate debt, so as to smooth income streams. The path of
debt incurred by the developer is implicit in the equilibrium outlined above, but here we draw it out
explicitly.  City debt at date z , [0, T] is given by the value of cumulated subsidy payments less land
rents collected, or
where integration and the discount factor cumulate past expenditures and the interest on them. 
Equation (23') comes from noting that
.  The
debt path is described by the following corollary.
Corollary 1.  Total city debt rises monotonically with city growth up to the last instant of
development.  Per person debt is declining towards the end of a city’s growth path.  Post-growth, land
rents collected exactly equal subsidies paid plus interest payments on the debt.
Proof: See Appendix 4. 
The underlying paths describing city finance are illustrated in Figure 3 which shows an
example of a subsidy schedule, per worker interest charges on the debt, and the level of subsidy minus
land rent.  Note that subsidies per worker decline and then rise again, mimicking the inverse of the LS
path so as to maintain constant income.  Debt accumulates according to the gap between rents
collected versus subsidies paid plus accumulated interest on the debt.  
It is essential to this argument that the city developers can neither renounce its debt, nor
expropriate house-owners.  Clearly, there is an incentive for a stationary city – one which has finished26
borrowing and in which house construction is complete – to renounce debt.  The only collateral for this
debt are the city assets, in our model just the housing stock.  However builders will not provide
housing if it is likely to be seized by debt holders, and lenders will not lend unless there is assurance of
repayment.  Furthermore, once house construction is complete there is also an incentive for developers
to expropriate house-owners by cutting subsidy payments. The final incidence of this falls on housing
rent, and builders will not provide housing if they are vulnerable to such expropriation. Note however
that we can construct an identical equilibrium in which the developer owns the housing and subsidy
payments need not be guaranteed. Once the developer owns housing, in order to retain residents and
cover all costs including the debt payments (which now increase by housing costs), the developer
would choose to offer the s(t) schedule, net of housing costs, that we constructed above.  Renunciation
of obligations is a fundamental problems in city finance.  
Finally we note the developer equilibrium has a dynamic version of the Henry George theorem.
In the static version, subsidies equal externalities and total subsidies exactly are paid out of land rents.
In the dynamic version, the present value of rents still covers the present value of subsidies paid out.
However there is no requirement at any instant that externalities equal subsidies nor that the present
value of total subsidies,  , equals the present value of total externalities,
. Rather the requirement is that the present value of externalities,  ,
created by the marginal entrant from a city’s initial occupation onward equals the present value of
subsidies,  , paid to that entrant .  What matters is the present value of the externalities of
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the marginal entrant.  
6.  Extensions 
We have assumed so far that all cities have identical and stationary underlying technologies.  As a
consequence they all have identical terminal size and growth is strictly sequential.  In this section we
relax these assumptions, allowing technology to vary across cities and with time. This introduces
heterogeneity in city sizes and periods of repeat growth in each city.  The motivation is twofold: to
show the model generalizes retaining basic properties and to show that one can generate a size
distribution of cities with the model that obeys Zipf’s Law. There is an extensive empirical literature27
arguing that, at least the right tail of the city size distribution across time and countries is approximated
by a power law distribution, with a special case being Zipf’s Law where the power law exponent is
one. As Krugman (1996) and Gabaix and Ioannides (2004) point out, there are two general ways to
generate such a distribution. One is to argue that geographic amenities, or the quality of possible city
locations follow a power law distribution, with a number of papers in the physical sciences arguing
that amenities follow such a distribution (e.g., Newman 2005). Then under certain conditions, city
sizes will follow a power law distribution. The other is to follow Simon (1955) and argue that certain
stochastic processes affecting city sizes generate Zipf’ Law, with a number of recent papers (Gabaix
1999, Cordoba 2004, Duranton 2007, Eeckhout 2004, and Rossi-Hansberg and Wright 2007) building
upon this idea. This paper follows the first approach for several reasons.
The recent theoretical papers following Simon’s approach argue that if city size growth rates
obey Gibrat’s Law so that growth rates have a distribution function with mean and variance
independent of city size, then the limit distribution of city sizes converges to Zipf’s Law. Using 
Gibrat’s Law to generate Zipf’s Law has the implication that cities continuously move through the size
distribution, so over time larger cities become smaller. Within the time horizons (100-150 years) for
which we have data, that result does not accord with the facts. In Japan and France over the last 150
years there has been almost no change in the rank order of the 50 or so largest cities (Eaton and
Eckstein 1997). In the USA since 1900, there is no downward movement of the largest cities through
the size distribution, only entry of new smaller cities “pushing” existing cities up the size distribution
(Black and Henderson 2003). A second issue is that Gibrat’s law is rejected in parametric tests in
empirical work (Black and Henderson, 2003, and Henderson and Wang, 2007) and  receives only weak
support in non-parametric work (Ioannides and Overman, 2003).
  Apart from empirics, it is problematic to adopt the stochastic approach in these recent papers to
the current model. The papers necessarily assume perfect mobility and malleability of all resources to
generate results. Moreover they must impose an arbitrary exogenous lower limit on city sizes. Absent
the latter, a log-normal distribution of city sizes emerges, rather than a Pareto distribution (Eeckhout
2004). Imposition of an arbitrary lower limit is unsettling. An initial idea was that irreversibility of
investment in this paper might provide a natural lower limit to city sizes. In fact that is not the case – 
any city facing an unlucky sequence of bad draws would be have its capital stock abandoned once28
rents required to retain citizens became negative. Moreover, incorporating ad hoc stochastic processes
into a situation with forward looking agents and irreversibility of investment (with or without
depreciation) introduces the optimal “hitting time problem” (McDonald and Siegel, 1986), whereby
builders delay the timing of investments relative to a certain world. Modelling the forward looking
behavior for investors in each city, new and old with evolved heterogeneity across cities from on-going
shocks under irreversible investment is an analytical problem well beyond the scope of the current
literature; hence the assumption of full malleability in the papers on Zipf’s Law. 
We now turn to our extensions and some discussion of the empirical literature.
  
6.1  Zipf’s Law and geographic heterogenity  
So far we have assumed that urban sites are all the same and cities all form under the same
circumstances. However, we expect urban sites to differ in production amenities such as natural
harbors or inland waterways which affect shipping costs and received prices, as well as in consumer
amenities related to weather, water resources, and mountains. Suppose city sites are heterogenous at
123 z least in the upper tail up to some site z; and ranked so that LS (n) > LS (n) > LS (n) >......> LS (n),
where builders always (rationally) choose the highest ranked unoccupied site to start a new city. The
equilibrium we will analyze involves sequential city formation as before, but with episodes of resumed
growth for existing cities. Thus in equilibrium, first city 1 grows solo; then city 2 grows solo; then
cities 1 and 2 grow together for an interval before they stop; then city 3 forms and grows solo; then 1, 2
and 3 grow together before city 4 forms and grows solo; and so on.   
Starting from the beginning of city formation, how long do builders contruct in city 1 before city
1 2 forms? Our treatment emphasizes the intuition, using two criteria. First, if city 1 grows for T  and then
city 2 grows for a length of time  , builders switch from 1 to 2,  when the present value of profits of
building in 2 equals what the present value of profits would be if a builder continued constructing in
city 1, an application of the no-switch condition. Before citing the application, we note second that, at
when both cities have completed their initial solo growth episodes, these cities should have the
same incomes and offer identical starting rents and thus marginal  investment opportunities for a
builder, so that29
. (24)
 This notion is further developed in (27) below, where for   , so marginal
investment opportunities and rents in cities 1 and 2 are always equal beyond  . Using equation
(24), the relevant version of the no-switch condition (17) is
    ,   (25)
In (25), city 1 grows until   declines to the point where the present value of rents paid and
equivalently of labor incomes earned of switching to city 2 equal those of building in city 1. From the
equilibrium, growth of city 1 beyond size   , given the decline in  , would result in less
profits than building in city 2. Given (24) and (25), 
(26)
where for now  , but this equation will apply to all future cities defining the length of their initial
spell of solo growth,  . 
What happens next? City 3 has an inferior site to cities 1 and 2 and can’t offer the same long
term present values of income and rents, based upon  . Thus it is more profitable to
resume building in city 1 and continue in 2 until incomes in those cities decline to a level where city 3
can compete. There are two implications. First during the time both cities 1 and 2 grow together, from
equation (15), rents equal , implying that for both to offer the same real income
   =  .   (27)
 
where for now, say,  i=1, j=2. Cities 1 and 2 cease growth and city 3 starts growth when city 3 can offer
for its growth interval the same present value of profits as building in city 1 or 2. This is an application
of an updated (25) where city 3 grows for an interval of length   such that at the end the marginal
investment opportunites in all three cities are the same, or30
.      (28) 
In (28),   is length of time cities 1 and 2 grow simulataneously before city 3 forms and " (t) is the
1
12 share of city 1 in the < flow at any instant during that T  episode of simultaneous growth. Then the
updated version of (23) applied to city 3 reduces to equation (25).  Equation (26) for city 3 and the two
equations in (28) solve for  . This process continues forward as we move to
successively lower order cities. Each forms after an episode of parallel growth of existing cities, where
the intution is that the resumed growth reduces incomes in existing cities down to the level that the next
new city can sustain. The model is solved by repeated application of equations (26) and an expanded
(28). 
Zipf’s Law.   To generate Zipf’s Law, assume   takes the form  , so heterogeneity is a public
amenity which shifts real income on either the production or consumption side. Consider the
heterogeneous cities at an instant when all cities are growing simultaneously, in which case   is
equal across all cities (eq. (27)). Differentiating, across cities, we know  , 
where . Since cities operate on the downward sloping portion of their   curves,
we know  .  In empirical implementation, if   follows a power law distribution, then
, for   the rank of amenity level   and b the power law exponent. Given this, 
the size distribution of cities follows  . This is a localized version of Zipf’s Law; but
if   is approximately constant across cities, the city size distribution will be well approximated by a
power law distribution with exponent  .
6.2 Other generalizations.
We now illustrate that the model generalizes to allow technology not just to differ across cities but also
time and to allow urban population growth to cease at some point. To allow technology to vary across
time, as well as cities, we replace the function LS(n(t)) by  . Time variations might be due to
changes in production or commuting technology which facilitate increases in city size, where the latter
is emphasized in the literature on city development (Mills, 1972). We illustrate equilibria by applying
the algorithm in (11) where builders always build in the highest profit cities. We assume that urban sites
heterogeneous, there is continuous technical progress at a constant rate during  ; this progress is31
specified to shift LS  functions up and out, so as to continuously increase optimal city sizes. And we
assume that, while population growth continues at rate <, it only does so for a fixed length of time,   ,
and then ceases. Building in cities that yield the highest profit, given the duality between rent
maximisation and income maximisation problems, is also equivalent to building in cities which offer
the highest present value of incomes, LS(n(t), relative to other cities, where we denote the present value
of incomes from construction date J by 
      .
Figures 4 a, b, and c illustrate outcomes for one example, where functional forms are given in
Appendix 5 (and also used in drawing other figures). Figure 4a gives the population of each city as a
function of time, where in equilibrium cities are occupied in order, starting with the city with the
highest natural amenity level. We see that, with our functional forms, just five cities develop, since the
system becomes stationary at  . As with pure heterogeneity, each city first experiences an initial period
of solo growth, and then alternates stationary periods with periods of continued growth. Technical
progress as modelled here increases agglomeration benefits, so part of resumed episodes of growth is
expanding to more take advantage of these benefits.
Figure 4b gives the values   along the equilibrium path. Each city is growing when it offers
the maximum value of  , and we see that, for example, in the interval when cities 1, 2, and 3 are all
growing, they are offering new migrants the same present values of incomes and builders thus the same
present value of rents. The equilibrium path of house rents where mobile workers are indifferent
between all cities at all dates is illustrated in Figure 4c for city 1 and, as in Figure 2, we see rent cycles.
Thus, at the date builders switch to city 2, where house rents are *H from equation (15), current
incomes in city 2 are small compared to city 1. New migrants only choose city 2 because rents spike in
city 1, given that builders have ceased construction there. 
The example shows how our approach can be generalised and how the main insights are robust.
Other extensions are possible, but not pursued here. For example, we have analysed a situation where
cities are subject to occasional, unanticipated shocks such as improvements in urban transport
technology. Also we have generated continuous growth of all cities by introducing adjustment costs at32
each instant to city size expansion. There sequential growth involves the latest new city growing much
more rapidly than existing cities for an interval.
6.3 Evidence
The data support the idea of sequential city formation, with new cities growing from scratch without
population losses for existing cities. In terms of population losses, for example, from 1900-1990 when
the USA moved from being 40% urban to 75% urban, Black and Henderson (2003) show that almost no
metro areas and certainly no medium or larger ones experienced significant (over 5%) population losses
between decades. In a worldwide data set for 1960-2000 covering all metro areas over 100,000,
Henderson and Wang (2005) identify 25 countries that start with just one metro area in 1960 and have
more metro areas form during 1960-2000.  Of these 25 initial metro areas, 22 experience no population
losses in subsequent decades. Of the 3 that do, none lose population at the decade when new metro
areas enter the picture; and each has a special circumstance (Phnom Penh in the 1970's and Latvia and
Estonia where all cities lose population from 1990-2000).
In an exhaustive study, Cuberes (2004) shows more generally that the data support the key
features of sequential growth. Cuberes covers city populations in 52 countries drawn from various
sources, using primarily metro area level data. The start date for each country depends on data
availability, most lying in the range 1880 to 1930, with the earliest being 1790 (USA) and the latest
1953 (Uruguay).  Cuberes first presents strong evidence that cities grow in sequence. He ranks the 5
largest cities at the start date for each country from 1 (largest) to 5 (smallest) and then plots which
ranked city has the highest growth rate in each decade. Sequential growth should have city 1 growing
fastest in the earliest decade(s), then city 2 in the next decade(s), then city 3 and so on. The data are
noisy, but for most countries a regression line against time and rank of the fastest growing city (at each
decade) has the hypothesized positive slope. In particular for today’s developed countries, 12 out of 16
have a positive slope, and for today’s medium and low income countries (where data start in the more
modern era, post-1925), 14 of 17 countries have positive slopes (Cuberes, Table 5).
Correspondingly, Cuberes also shows that individual cities tend to have early periods of rapid
growth (from their date of entry as a city), followed by slow growth and/or stagnation. Taking the
starting top 5 cities in each country he shows there is an-inverted U-relationship between the share of33
the 5 cities in total national or total national urban population and time. Correspondingly, the inverted-
U relationship between urban primacy (share of the largest city) and time is well established in the
literature (e.g, Junius, 1999).
7.  Concluding comments.
In this paper we develop a dynamic model to analyze the problem of city formation and city size in an
economy in which total urban population is increasing, an environment relevant for many developing
countries experiencing rapid urbanization.  The dynamic context has a number of advantages.  It yields
sequential formation of cities, where new cities grow from scratch to a stationary size as is more
consistent with the worldwide data on city formation and growth, rather than instantly jump to that size.
It enables the competitive equilibrium to be analyzed free of simple coordination failures. It allows us
to see how prices of fixed housing assets vary between growing and stationary cities. And it enables us
examine a role for city borrowing and debt accumulation.
We find that socially optimal city size is larger than in a static model; cities should grow beyond
the point at which surplus per worker is maximized.  The competitive equilibrium with no city
governments may support cities that are larger or smaller than socially efficient, depending on how
externalities vary with city size. In the competitive equilibrium housing prices in stationary cities cycle
with the growth of a new city, mirroring the evolution of per worker income in the growing city,
potentially an empirically testable finding. Then we show that large developers or public city
governments can internalize the externalities and support the social optimum. These institutions also
smooth the time path of housing prices in stationary cities and of income paths in new cities. But the
institutional requirements for such equilibria are strong. We looked at extensions involving
heterogeneity of cities and technical change to show our basic results are robust; and that, under
appropriate conditions, the model generates a size distribution of cities following Zipf’s Law.34
Appendix 1: Commuting costs and rent gradients  
Population at distance l from the CBD is kl  and commuting costs from this distance are cl , where 2 =
20
0 or 1, in respectively a linear or circular city and 0 $ 1. k represents the combination of lot size and
geography of the city where, for example, in a circular city with lot size 1,  . Total population in
a city of radius   (or line length  ) is:
,  so  . (A1)
Edge commuting costs are: . (A2)
Total commuting costs are
(A3)
We define   and choose units (of lot size for a specific geography) such that
.  Edge commuting costs and total commuting costs in Table 1 follow directly.  Total land
rent is population, n, times edge commuting cost times minus total commuting costs.  
Appendix 2: Proofs related to Proposition 1 
A: Uniqueness.
opt opt opt  This part shows  solves at a unique value of T  where n  = <T and
opt A n >  n . . Assumption A3 on single peakedness tells us that the gradient 
 and is therefore decreasing until  
and strictly increasing thereafter.  The value of the integral is therefore strictly increasing through zero
opt opt A at T =  T , ensuring existence of a unique solution where  n >  n .                                
 B:  Inefficiency of simultaneous development of multiple new cities
In Proposition 1, where each city forms in sequence and grows to its optimal stationary size, the
objective function can be rewritten in simplified form as 35
The term in square brackets is the total surplus in a city founded at date zero and growing to date T at
where the surplus at every instant from then on is TS(<T), with present value
.  At T  another city is founded and the process repeats itself.  The
term multiplying the square brackets is the sum of the geometric series 1 + e  + e  ..., which
-*T -*2T
represents sums the present value of all future cities. Optimization with respect to T gives first order
condition,
This condition can be reworked to give (7'), where from integration by parts we know  
    .            (A4)
We also note for later use another integration by parts result:                
                                                                               (A5)               
In the alternative solution where k cities form and grow simultaneously before reaching their
stationary state,  the new objective function, net of housing costs, is
         
Optimising gives the same form to the first order condition for T as in (7') (although different optimal
values, as functions depend on <t/k).  The first order condition for k is36
(A6) 
On the RHS, given eq (7'), the first term in square brackets is zero (implied by the first order condition
defining the optimal T in this context ).  Given assumption A3,  MS is strictly increasing to a peak
before it is strictly decreasing. Then the second term in square brackets in (A6) must be positive:
relative to the first term of (A6), the same items,  ,  in the expression when negative
get low t weights and when positive ones high t weights). Thus the whole condition is negative,
indicating that increases in k reduce welfare. k is bounded below by one, the solution we characterise. 
C:  Inefficiency of jump solution 
If workers can be moved between cities at zero cost then a new city size can jump to some size. 
Suppose that instead of growing continuously through interval [0, T] a new city jumps at date . to
population <..  For t , [0, .] new migrants accumulate in old cities. Pure irreversibility is not sufficient
to prevent such a jump; if the fixed cost of housing is small, then it can be efficient to have some jump
in city size – to store people near   in o ld cities for an interval of length .,  to avoid the low AS
values in a new city until it optimal to move a mass of people into a new city. The cost of this jump is
that new migrants have to be accommodated in existing cities until they jump to a new city where
housing is then built for them; and we need to make this cost sufficiently high. In particular, the present
value of the extra housing costs incurred over [0, T] is:
(A7)
The first term is the cost of holding <. houses in old cities.  The remaining terms give the cost saving in
the new city from the fact that <. units of housing are constructed at date . (second term) rather than
being constructed continuously through t , [0, . ].  Using integral (A5), this expression integrates to:
(A8)
which can be interpreted directly as the present value of the opportunity cost of having empty houses. 37
The term outside the square brackets is the opportunity cost per house.  Inside, the first term is the
number of houses that are empty for t , [., T], and the second the number that are empty at date t , [0,
. ], each discounted back to date zero.  
The benefit of jumping is the value of putting new workers arriving during t , [0, . ] in an
established city with average surplus AS(<T) rather than in a growing city with surplus AS(<t),
 . (A9)
Hence, the net benefit is
  (A10)
.
Setting (A10) equal to zero defines the value of H above which it is not profitable to jump. In the
second line, the first square bracketed expression is positive. [Note, in the second line, the second
integral in that first square brackets is positive. In that integral, the term in parentheses under that
integral is declining in t;  the integral is  zero without discounting; and thus it is positive with
discounting.].  A sufficient condition for C > B, then is that the second square bracketed term is also
positive. Given at the optimum that  , assumption A4, which requires
, ensures that this. Since   is the maximum value of AS and   the
minimum, then at the optimum   for all t , [0, T]. 
Appendix 3: Proofs related to proposition 2
(a) A unique   solves (13). Equation (13) takes value zero at T = 0.  Its gradient is given by
L  and is therefore decreasing until T  and
strictly increasing thereafter (by strict concavity of the function LS, assumption A1).  The value of the
eq integral is therefore strictly increasing through zero at T = T , ensuring existence of a unique solution. 38
(A11)
(A12)
Note for equation (13) to hold   
(b) The no-switch condition (17) is satisfied with inequality for all z , (J, T). This follows since  LS is
initially strictly increasing and then decreasing, noting that terms beyond   are zero. As z rises from
J, initially negative terms in   in (17) are dropped making the
expression positive, with it only going to 0 again at T.
(c) h(t) > 0 for all t.  This condition will be satisfied if    Given the right-hand
A side is less than AS(<T ) - AS(0) in assumption A4, (the peak value of LS is less than that for AS), the
condition is met under A4.   
Appendix 4: Derivations, Section 5
1) Optimization problem (20)
The Lagrangean corresponding to (20) is:
where the function is written with the constraint as an integral over J from 0 to T with multipliers 8(J). 
The first order condition for s(t) at date z is 
from which  .  This is strictly positive at all dates, so the constraint binds at all times.
Differentiating the constraint with respect to  J gives  .  Maximizing 
(A11) with respect to T  has the solution  ,  given  from
Table 1, where also these relationships imply  .
2) Jumps in city sizes are unprofitable.
A The best possible jump for a developer  is to instantaneously create a city of size n  and maximal real39
A income, AS(n ).  However, this is not profitable.  Creating this new city would reduce house rents in
existing cities according to equation (16), inducing residents to stay in old cities. To induce inter-city
migration the developer would have to offer migrants enough income to drive rents in old cities to zero. 
opt A But doing so is not profitable; assumption A4 is sufficient to ensure that MS(<T ) > AS(n ) - *H, where
A AS(n ) - *H is the maximum income net of housing rent demanded by builders which a new city
A jumping to n   can pay migrants. 
3) Proof of Corollary 1
For the debt expressions, from equation (23),
. (A13)
Using (A4) and (A5) this can be integrated to give
.          (A14)
opt At date J = T  this expression reduces to 
           (A15)
(derived using equation (7`)). This says that debt service is equal to total surplus minus the real income
payment to workers, equal in turn to rents minus subsidies, so   .
Differentiating (A14) with respect to time, J, 
.  (A16) 
opt Thus DN(J) 6 0 as J 6 T , from eq.(7`).  In the last term in (A16), the term in the integral is positive for
small J, and then eventually declines monotonically, given assumption A3 (see Figure 1).  Thus the
opt integral starts positive, increases, and then decreases monotonically until it is zero at T , implying that
opt opt total debt is always increasing up to T .  Since DN(J) 6 0 as J 6 T , it must be the case that, with40
opt strictly positive population growth until T , debt per worker peaks at some point and then declines.
 
Appendix 5:  The Example in Figure 4 
The figure was constructed with both heterogeneity and technical change using:
i with c = 0.2, ( = 2, and efficiency level a following sequence {1.0, 0.975, 0.95, 0.925, 0.9, 0.875, 0.85}
* = 0.008 and < = 0.012 for t , [0, 1000] and < = 0 thereafter.41
1.  These urban scale economies can be given a variety of micro foundations ( Duranton and
Puga, 2004).
2. In this case we would add an income term to (1), the worker’s share in national urban land
rents, which is perceived as fixed by any worker.
3. The present value of the marginal surplus from s onwards in the current growing city minus
the present value of the surplus of a new city founded at time s and growing for an interval T
before stopping reduces to equation (6).
4. An issue concerns whether there could possibly be a sequence of T’s of different values (e.g.,
ji T < T) which satisfy repeated application of (17), with the second term on the RHS being non-
zero. If such a sequence could exist, we rule it out by applying ‘stationarity’ in the spirit of
Duffie, Geanakoplos, Mas-Colell, and McLennan (1994) or Baron and Ferejohn (1989). If
builders who build in cities i and j switch places in time, so those who build in j now build earlier
in i and those in i now build later in j, we require these builders take the same actions with the
same outcomes, given the fundamentals are unchanged.
eq eq 5. Suppose that the first city stops growing just before T .  Then its LS(<T ) would be somewhat
greater, which shifts up its   curve at all future dates, given the path LS(<t) - *H of new
growing cities.  This means that future house rents in this city would be higher, making it
profitable to continue building, rather than stopping and switching to a new city.  And if a city
eq eq grows past T  , that lowers LS(<T ) and shifts down the   path the builder will receive once
the city is stationary, lowering rents so that their present value will no longer cover housing cost. 
6. The game considers only stationary equilibria in the spirit of Duffie, Geanakoplos, Mas-Colell
and McLennan (1994). Second, it treats agents as discrete, while, in a continuous time
formulation, agents are atomless. This problem is resolved by requiring the continuum
equilibrium to be an equilibrium in a finite approximation setting. Finally, the potential Bertrand
pricing indeterminancy problem with inelastic housing demand is solved by an appropriate
staging of the game. At each instant, in stage 1 owners of all existing housing announce the spot
prices at which they commit to rent their house that instant. In stage 2 an endogenous number of
new builders enters from the pool of potential builders. Playing in a predetermined sequence,
each builder decides whether to enter; and, if she enters, commits to provide a house in a
particular city at an announced spot rent at that instant. In stage 3, the new (current migrants) and
existing urban population choose simultaneously where to live, production occurs, and incomes
and prices are paid. If we start the evolution of city development in the economy from time 0,
there is a unique equilibrium path. We illustrate some aspects of the game.
In time 0, there are no existing houses. At that instant, in stage 2, the first builder enters,
chooses a city, and announces rent  . At time 0, the second builder has a choice– either join
the first or go to a new location. This builder anticipates stage 3 where, if all  builders each
charging  have entered the same city in stage 2, that city will attract all migrants in stage 3,
compared to any potential smaller city with spot rents of at least opportunity cost  , since LS is
Endnotes:42
initially  rising. If the second builder chooses a new location, subsequent builders would join him
with at most probability .5, so he runs the risk of a loss. Given this, the rational choice is to join
the first city, as it is for subsequent builders. Note that if any builder announces more than  , a
builder would enter in stage 2 and the deviator’s house would be unoccupied (this is the
result previously from differentiating equation (10)).  Finally in this first instant, in stage 3, the
first migrants choose a house at the announced rent. At the second instant, in stage 1, old builders
announce spot prices, anticipating stage 2, where   builders will enter the first city each offering
spot rent  .   Note if stage 1 prices are announced to exceed  , it pays any stage 1 owner to
deviate because such a stage 1 pricing profile would induce   builders to enter in stage 2 each
charging just under the announced stage 1 price. In stage 3 all houses offered in stage 1 would be
empty.  Stages 2 and 3 in the second instant proceed as for the first instant and the process
continues until the first city reaches size .  
At  , new builders switch to a new city. First, the same logic in the game as for the first
city dictates that only one new city forms at  . Second, no builder would deviate from building
in a new city at  ,  to resume construction in the old, given
.  Similarly, if the old city were to grow longer
than  , a builder in stage 2 would profitably deviate to build in a new city. And no builder
would deviate to start to build in a second city before   : the other builders would enter in stage
2 to supply migrants in stage 3 at price   in the old city and the new city wouldn’t be
unoccupied. Finally relative to the rents charged in old cities when they stop growing after time
T, in stage 1, there is not a pricing equilibrium with higher rents. As discussed above, that would
lead to entry of additional builders in stage 2 in the new city and the risk for stage 1 suppliers of
having unoccupied housing, inducing stage 1 price competition until prices equal those given in
(16). 
7. For other comparative statics, it is possible to show that a faster rate of population inflow, <,
eq eq reduces T , although it has an ambiguous effect on city size <T
eq 8. We note also that T  gives a size which maximizes the present values at date of their entry of
the incomes of all entrants. For entrants at date J, the present value of income net of housing
costs is 
.
The first term is the present value to entrants at time J of their income during the remaining
growth time of the city.  In the second term, the integral expression gives the present value of 
income net of housing costs for any resident of the city in steady state during the growth cycle of
each successive new city.  This cycle repeats indefinitely but only starts after a time length (T - J) 
(hence the term   before the second integral).  Maximizing this expression with
respect to T gives eq. (13), for any J.  The intuition is that changing T only changes final income
and the future income net of rent cycles after the city stops growing; these changes apply to
everyone regardless of date of entry. 43
9.It is not essential the subsidy path employed by the national government follow the Pigouvian
one.  By comparing (7') and (13) it is only necessary that s(t) be constructed to satisfy
so that the present value of subsidies in a new city compared to an old city are equal to the
difference between the present value of externalities in a growing and a stationary city. As an
example of an alternative subsidy path, the national government could set s(T) = 0. Then the
present value of subsidies offered over the growth of a new city should equal the difference
between the present value of the externality in that city, and the present value of the externality in
the old city, which can be positive or negative according to whether competitive equilibrium
cities, absent policy, are too large or too small as in Proposition 3.
10. Now . 
The swings in housing prices and hence also real income will be greater than without national
government intervention, since MS has larger swings than LS.  This raises the possibility that the
condition for house rents to be non-negative could be violated, in the sense that Assumption A4
does not ensure that   for all t.
11.This requirement follows from equation (7'), given
   and 44
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